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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of Case

This litigation began as a property dispute between two neighbors, Janet Heath and
Walter and Wilma Wallace. See R., p.12 - 15. Their dispute focused upon their respective rights
under a Joint Driveway Agreement signed by Wallace and the former owner of Ms. Heath's
property and, disputes between the Wallaces and Mr. Still that arose after the property was
purchased by Heath. See R., p.12 - 14. Heath contends the real estate agent assisting her during
the transaction, Ms. Angela Palmer, violated statutory duties owed to her under the Idaho
Brokerage Representation Act (IBRA) found at I.C. §54-2082, et seq. She contends those
statutory violations constituted a breach of contract and negligence. See R., pp.159 - 160.
B. Course of Proceedings

The Petition for Quiet Title and Preliminary Injunction which commenced this litigation
was filed by Walter and Wilma Wallace against Ms. Heath and, Bruce Still. See R., p.12 - 22.
Heath and Still filed an Answer. See R., p.29 - 40. On 3/5/2019, Heath filed a Third-Party
Complaint against Angela Palmer and Jed Taylor d/b/a Taylor Real Estate. See R., pp.151, 155 160. Palmer and Taylor answered the Third-Party Complaint. See R., pp.163 - 169.
On April 23, 2019, Heath filed a motion for partial summary judgment against Palmer
and Taylor. See R., p. 188 - 189. Taylor and Palmer responded on May 9, 2019 and, included
their own motion for summary judgment challenging Ms. Heath's claims. See R., pp.291 - 309.
On June 24, 2019, the court heard oral arguments. See R., p.8. On August 20, 2019, the
court issued its "Order Denying Third-Party Plaintifrs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
and Granting Third-Party Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment." See R., pp.400 416. Judgment was entered on August 21, 2019 dismissing the third-party claims. See R., pp.417
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 4

- 418. Palmer and Taylor then filed their Memorandum of Costs on September 11, 2019. See R.,
p.9. On October 11, 2019, an amended judgment was entered awarding Palmer and Taylor
$9,640.00 attorney's fees and, $140.00 costs. See R., pp.442 - 443. Heath's Notice of Appeal
was filed October 10, 2019. See R., pp.420 - 423.
C. Statement of Facts

In the fall of 2007, Janet Heath began looking for residential property in Bingham
County, Idaho. See R., p.155 (Third-Party Complaint, ,r20). She contacted her cousin, Angela
Palmer, who was a real estate agent affiliated with Taylor Real Estate. See R., pp.311, 345
(Palmer Deel., ,r2, Taylor Deel., ,r2). Heath originally contacted Palmer through a text message
stating "I might want to look into buying a house, but I have no idea where to start and like no
down payment, and a first-time buyer, can you help me out? Be my realtor please if I decide to
go this way." See R., p.366. Palmer responded by stating that she could help her get started and
could send her information to help her find a lender. Id. Four days later, Heath signed an agency
disclosure receipt and a proposed purchase contract for the property. See R., pp.311, 315 - 327
(Palmer Deel., ,r,r2 - 4, Exb 1 and 2). The purchase contract between Heath and the seller,
Ciccone, confirmed that Palmer and Taylor Real Estate were "acting as a NONAGENT for the
BUYER." See R., p.324 (Palmer Deel., Exb 2, p.6, ,r34). After the Heath offer was tendered to
the seller, Heath accepted the Ciccone counteroffer. At that time, a purchase contract was
formed. See R., p.311, 319 - 329, (Palmer Deel., ,r4, Exb 2 and 3). The seller/Ciccones provided
a property condition disclosure form required by I.C. §§55-2504 and 2510 which was forwarded
by Palmer to Ms. Heath. See R., pp.311, 333 - 337 (Palmer Deel., ,r4, Exb 4). That disclosure
revealed the existence of a shared well agreement and, a shared driveway agreement with the
neighbors, Walter and Wilma Wallace. Id. Copies of the 1998 driveway agreement were
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provided to Heath on December 7, 2017. See R., pp.268 - 311, (Heath Deel., ,r2; Palmer Deel.,
,r4).
Consistent with the terms and conditions of the purchase contract, Ms. Heath had the
property professionally inspected. Following those inspections, she requested certain repairs be
undertaken by the seller. See R., p.312 (Palmer Deel.,

,rs).

Thereafter, Heath accepted the

condition of the property. The closing was scheduled for January 19, 2018. See R., p.312
(Palmer Deel., ,I8). Prior to closing, Palmer was advised by the title company that language
needed to be added to the shared driveway agreement to assure that it would run with the land
and, be enforceable after the property was purchased by Heath. See R., pp.206, 210, 312 (Palmer
Deel., ,I6; Palmer depo., p.45:7 - 23; p.59:22 - p.60:21). It was Palmer's understanding that,
without modifications, the title company would not insure the title and the closing could not
occur. It was also her understanding the seller, Ciccone, was working with the neighbor,
Wallace, to modify the agreement. Id.
Ten (10) days prior to closing, January 9, 2018, Palmer received a copy of the proposed
revised driveway agreement from the title company. She immediately forwarded a copy to Ms.
Heath. See R., pp.312, 339,363 - 364 (Palmer Deel., ,r6, Exb 5; Heath Deel., ,I14). Heath admits
that, after receiving the revised driveway agreement, she did not read the document and, did not
contact Ms. Palmer with any questions. See R., p.364 (Heath Deel., ,rt 4). She attempts to explain
her failure to read the agreement by stating she assumed Ms. Palmer would review the document
and advise her of any issues that may have existed. Id.
Once the modified agreement was signed by the seller and the neighbor, Ms. Palmer
understood the transaction could then close. See R., p.312 (Palmer Deel., ,I7). She did not
compare the earlier agreement and the revised 2018 agreement as she had been advised by the
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title company the only change it required focused upon assuring the agreement ran with the land
and would be enforceable by the buyer, Heath, after the sale. Palmer had no reason to believe
any other changes would be made. See R., p.312 (Palmer Deel., ,r7).
Despite having copies of the 1998 as well as the 2018 driveway agreements ten days
prior to closing, Heath did not express any concerns or objections concerning the documents or,
any other information she had received prior to closing. See R., pp.312 - 313 (Palmer Deel., ,rs).
The transaction closed on January 19, 2018. Palmer had no knowledge of any disputes between
Ms. Heath and the Wallaces until nearly a year after the closing. See R., pp.312 - 313 (Palmer
Deel., ,rs).
II.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Whether Heath has waived any argument challenging the District Court's ruling granting
summary judgment to Jed Taylor d/b/a Taylor Real Estate?
2. Whether Heath has waived any argument challenging the District Court's ruling granting
Respondents their attorney's fees.
3. Whether Heath has waived any argument that a failure to provide her a copy of the agency
disclosure brochure on November 20, 2017 did not state a private right of action.
4. Whether Heath's negligence claims are barred by the economic loss rule.
5. Whether the appellants are entitled to their attorney's fees incurred defending the present
appeal.
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III.
ARGUMENT
A. Rulings by the District Court that are not challenged in the appellant's opening
brief cannot be considered on appeal.

Under the Idaho Rules of Appellate Procedure, the appellant's opening brief must include
a statement of the issues presented on appeal and, an argument. See IAR 35(a)(4)(6). In the
argument section, the appellant is required to identify legal issues to be considered and provide
authorities and statutes supporting the issues it feels the court should consider. See JAR 35(a)(6).
Appellate courts will not consider any issue that is not supported by propositions of law,
authority, or argument. See Inter/ode Contractors, Inc. v. Bryant, 132 Idaho 443, 974 P.2d 89
(Ct. App. 1999); Weaver v. Suri Bros., 129 Idaho 497, 927 P.2d 887 (1996); Taylor v.

Browning, 129 Idaho 483, 927 P.2d 873 (1996). The failure to raise legal issues in the opening
brief will preclude the appellate courts from addressing those matters. See Sun Valley Shopping

Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 803 P.2d 993 (1991); U.S. Bank Nat'/ Ass'n v.
Kuenzli, 134 Idaho 222, 99 P .2d 877 (2000). Finally, the appellate courts will not consider
arguments raised for the first time in the appellant's reply brief. See State v. Klingler, 126 Idaho
737, 890 P.2d 323 (1995); Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians PA, 138 Idaho 200, 61 P.3d
557 (2002).
1. The decision granting summary judgment in favor of Jed Taylor must be
affirmed.

The District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order addressed the claims against both
Angela Palmer and her broker, Jed Taylor. The court's order concluded that neither Palmer or
Taylor violated any statutory or contractual duties owed to Ms. Heath. See R., p.413. The court
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also concluded Heath had failed to establish a basis for indemnity against Taylor. See R., p.414.
On that basis, summary judgment was granted in favor of Taylor and Palmer. See R., p.415.
Lacking in Ms. Heath's opening brief is any discussion of statutory or contractual duties
violated by Mr. Taylor in connection with Ms. Heath's purchase of the subject property from the
Wallaces. Mr. Taylor's involvement was limited to his role as Palmer's broker. See R., p.343
(Taylor Deel., ,r,r3 - 4). This is important considering the duties owed by the broker who is
supervising an agent (Ms. Palmer) differ from the duties owed by the agent working with a client
or customer. See and compare LC. §54-2038 with §§54-2086 and 54-2087. The appellant's
opening brief does not mention Mr. Taylor and does not explain how he breached any statutory
or contractual duties owed to Heath surrounding his supervision of Palmer. For that reason, the
District Court's ruling granting summary judgment in favor of Mr. Taylor must be affirmed.

2. The District Court's ruling granting Palmer and Taylor's Motion for Attorney's
Fees must be affirmed.
After the District Court granted the Third-Party Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment, it also awarded attorney's fees and entered an amended judgment granting Taylor and
Palmer $9,640.00 in fees and costs totaling $140.00. See R., p. 442 - 443. Ms. Heath has failed
to discuss that ruling in her opening brief. As such, she has waived any argument challenging
this aspect of the District Court's Order. For that reason, the District Court's ruling granting
attorney's fees and costs must be affirmed.

3. Whether the failure to provide a customer or client with an agency disclosure
brochure states a private cause of action.
At summary judgment, Ms. Heath argued Palmer violated statutory duties owed to a
"customer" by failing to provide her a copy of the agency disclosure brochure published by the
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Idaho Real Estate Commission at the first substantial business contact. She argued Palmer's
actions violated I.C. §54-2085. See R., ,r372.
Rejecting this argument, the District Court ruled that, assuming Ms. Heath's November
20, 201 7 text to Palmer could be considered a "substantial business contact", any statutory
violation was cured four days later when the brochure was received by Heath during her meeting
with Palmer where they discussed making an offer to purchase the property. See R., pp.409 410. The District Court ruled that, assuming the brochure should have been provided earlier, any
statutory violation that may have arisen could only subject Palmer to discipline by the Idaho Real
Estate Commission. See R., p.410. The court concluded that because the alleged failure to
provide the agency disclosure form earlier presented a potential discipline issue rather than a
private right of action for damages, any claims for alleged violations of I.C. §54-2085(1) were
without merit and should be dismissed. Id.
This aspect of the District Court's ruling has not been challenged in Ms. Heath's opening
brief. Accordingly, the District Court's ruling that the alleged failure to provide a copy of the
agency disclosure form on 11/20/2017 was not a private right of action must be affirmed.
B. Negligence Claims.

Ms. Heath's negligence claims allege Palmer breached statutory duties created by the
IBRA found at I.C. §54-2084 - 2097. See R., p.159 (Third-Party Complaint p.9, ,r,r37 - 42).
Those alleged statutory violations are the legal duties she contends establish Palmer was
negligent. See R., p.159. As outlined at I.C. §1, below, Heath and Palmer did not execute a
contract for agency representation. Ms. Heath was a "customer" of Ms. Palmer and Taylor Real
Estate. As a customer, she was owed the duties found at I.C. §54-2086. The negligence claims
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should be dismissed as they are barred by the economic loss rule. Additionally, the District Court
properly found Ms. Palmer fulfilled all statutory duties owed to her customer, Ms. Heath.
1. Economic Loss Rule

One of the arguments raised by Palmer in support of her motion for summary judgment
was the fact the plaintiffs negligence claims are barred by the economic loss rule. See R., p.384.
Although the District Court did not rely upon the economic loss rule to dismiss the negligence
claims it is well-settled that, on appeal, this Court can affirm a District Court's grant of summary
judgment under a different legal theory than relied upon by the trial court. See Curlee v.
Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 397, 224 P.3d 458, 464 (2008), citing
McCusky v. Canyon County, 123 Idaho 657,663,851 P.2d 953,959 (1993).

The economic loss rule is a judicially created doctrine that applies to negligence claims.
As noted in Clark v. Int'/ Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978), "the economic
expectations of parties have not traditionally been protected by the law governing unintentional
torts". Id at 335. "Unless an exception applies, the economic loss rule prohibits recovery of
purely economic losses in a negligence action because there is no duty to prevent economic loss
to another." Blaad v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296,300, 108 P.3d 996, 1000 (2005).
In Path to Health, LLP v. Long, 161 Idaho 50, 383 P.3d 1220 (2016), this Court ruled
the economic loss rule would apply to negligence claims against a real estate agent accused of
violating statutory duties owed to a represented client. The plaintiff alleged the agent failed to
accurately disclose the true status of the subject property's zoning. Following the closing, the
plaintiff discovered existing zoning restrictions rendered the property unsuitable for his intended
use. This Court characterized the damages caused by the fact the property did not meet the
plaintiffs needs as economic losses barred by the economic loss rule. See 161 Idaho at 56. For
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that reason, the negligence claims were dismissed. See also Graefe v. Vaughn, 132 Idaho 349,
972

P.2d 317 (Ct.

App.

1999) (summary judgment granted dismissing negligent

misrepresentation claims where the plaintiffs realtor mistakenly represented the zoning status of
the property and, its suitability for the plaintiffs business use).
In this case, much like Path to Health v. Long and Graefe v. Vaughn, the damages
sought by Ms. Heath describe economic losses surrounding her purchase of real estate she
contends does not suit her needs. These claims, like the price of allegedly defective property, are
economic losses that are not compensable in tort. See Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 351, 544 P.2d 306, 309 (1975) (" ... the difference between

property damage and economic loss was: property damage encompasses damage to property
other than that which is the subject of the transaction. Economic loss includes cost to repair and
replacement of defective property which is the subject of the transaction as well as commercial
loss for inadequate value, inconsequential loss of profits or use."). Ms. Heath's negligence
claims seek economic losses and, for that reason, should be dismissed.
2. Palmer fulfilled all statutory duties owed to her customer, Ms. Heath.

Under the IBRA, a party to a regulated real estate transaction is either a "client" or a
"customer"of the licensee or brokerage. See Staff of the Idaho State Real Estate Commission v.
Nordling, 135 Idaho 630, 22 P.3d 105 (2002); see also I.C. §§54-2085 and 54-2087. Whether an

individual is a "customer" or a "client" depends upon whether that individual has entered into a
written representation agreement with the licensee and the brokerage. Id. See also LC. §§542084 and 54-2085. An individual is a "customer" where they have not entered into a written
representation agreement. Nordling, 135 Idaho at 635. An individual is a "client" if they have
signed a written contract for representation. See I.C. §54-2087; see also Johnson v. McPhee,
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147 Idaho 455, 210 P.3d 563 (Ct. App. 2009). Any change in the agency relationship must be in
writing. See I.C. §§54-2085(3) and 54-2091(2).
As outlined below, it is undisputed Ms. Heath never entered into a buyer's representation
agreement with Ms. Palmer or Taylor Real Estate. See R., pp. 311, 343. In fact, the purchase and
sale agreement Heath signed contains a paragraph entitled "Representation Confirmation" that
specifically states "The brokerage working with the BUYER(S) is acting as a NONAGENT for
the BUYER(S)". See R., p.324.
Idaho Code §54-2086 outlines the duties owed by a real estate agent to a "customer" such
as Ms. Heath. The statute, in pertinent part, reads:
54-2086 Duties to a Customer - (1) If a buyer, prospective buyer, or seller is not
represented by a brokerage in a regulated real estate transaction, that buyer or seller
remains a customer, and as such, the brokerage and its licensees are nonagents and
owe the following legal duties and obligations:
a. To perform ministerial acts to assist the buyer or seller in the sale or
purchase of real estate;
b. To perform these acts with honesty, good faith, reasonable skill and care;
c. To properly account for monies or property placed in the care and
responsibility of the brokerage;
d. To disclose to the buyer/customer all adverse material facts actually
known or which reasonably should have been known by the licensee;
e. To disclose to the seller/customer all adverse facts actually known or
which reasonably should have been known by the licensee.

(5) A non-agent brokerage and its licensees owe no duty to a buyer/customer to
conduct an independent inspection of the property for the benefit of that
buyer/customer and owe no duty independently verify the accuracy or
completeness of any statement or representation made by the seller or any source
reasonably believed by the licensee to be reliable.
(6) A non-agent brokerage and its licensees owe no duty to seller/customer to
conduct and independent investigation of the buyer's financial condition for the
benefit of that seller/customer and owe no duty to independently verify the
accuracy or completeness of statements made by the buyer or any source
reasonably believed by the licensee to be reliable.
The statutory duties Palmer owed to Heath as a "customer" were limited to performing
ministerial acts associated with the transaction. The term "ministerial acts" is defined to include
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 13

those "reasonably necessary and customary acts typically perfonned by real estate licensees in
assisting a transaction to its closing or conclusion." See I.C. §54-2083(12). While adverse
material facts must be disclosed and monies in the agent's possession accounted for, Palmer was
not required to conduct inspections or verify the accuracy or completeness of any statement or
representation by the seller, Ciccone, or any other source she reasonably believed to be reliable.
See I.C. §54-2086(5). 1

Ms. Heath argues Palmer's ministerial duties included drafting the shared driveway
agreement and assuring it met her particular needs. See appellate brief, p.15. She relies upon an
email dated 1/9/2018 (R., p.339), to suggest Palmer agreed to expand her statutory duties thereby
assuming responsibility for the driveway agreement. Id. This argument is inconsistent with the
record and the language of I.C. §54-2086.
3. Palmer's statutory duties outlined in I.C. §54-2086 cannot be expanded.

The initial and overriding flaw in Heath's argument is her attempt to conflate the
statutory language governing relationships between a realtor and their "client" found at LC. §542087 with the separate and distinct statutory language found at LC. §54-2086. Relying upon

Path to Health v. Long, supra, Heath suggests that, through an email dated 1/9/2018, R. p.339,
Heath expanded her statutory duties. See appellate brief, pp.18 - 20.
Contrary to the facts in this case, in Path to Health v. Long, the realtor and the plaintiff
had entered into a written contract for agency representation. See 161 Idaho at 53. That contract
explicitly stated the agent would not investigate the zoning of the property. Id. Despite the fact
the agent owed no statutory or contractual duty to investigate zoning issues, he advised his client,

1

Other sources would include the information Palmer received from the title company advising
her the driveway agreement would need to be modified to include language assuring it would run
with the land.
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on at least three separate occasions, "I have checked on the zoning and you 're ok." See 161
Idaho at 59.
In Path to Health, this Court affirmed the dismissal of the negligence claims but ruled
the statutory duties owed by the agent to his client pursuant to I.C. §54-2087, were incorporated
into and made part of the existing buyer's representation agreement. See 161 Idaho at 57 - 58.
Those incorporated statutory duties could then be litigated as a breach of contract and required
the agent to perform the terms of the agreement with reasonable skill and care and, "promote the
best interests of the client in good faith, honesty, and fair dealing ... " See I.C. §54-2087(1)- (4).
See 161 Idaho 59. By incorporating the agent's statutory duties into the existing representation
agreement, the defendant's alleged failure to accurately describe the status of the zoning was
transformed from a negligence claim into a breach of contract that was unaffected by the Court's
ruling dismissing the negligence claims pursuant to the economic loss rule. See 161 Idaho at 56.
Lacking in the Path to Health v. Long opinion is any language suggesting the statutory
duties created by LC. §54-2086 and, 54-2087 can be construed together to create identical or
similar duties in tort or contract. The Path to Health decision acknowledged §§54-2086 and 542087 contained language that limited an agent's duty to undertake inspections, !ll 161 Idaho at
57 - 58. Despite these limited duties, this Court recognized both statutes require an agent to
perform the duties outlined in each separate statute with honesty which obligates the agent to
refrain from making misrepresentations of material fact. See 161 Idaho at 58. In Path to Health,
the agent's misrepresentation arose from his statement that he had "checked on the zoning and
you're okay". While the court's opinion does not address whether the agent did anything to
"check on the zoning" there was no question the existing zoning restrictions were inconsistent
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with the plaintiffs intended use. That misstatement of fact led the plaintiff to believe the existing
zoning was acceptable which, caused its damages. See 161 Idaho at 59.
Contrary to Heath's argument, the duties owed to a client do not override or supplement
the independent duties Palmer owed to a "customer" pursuant to I.C. §54-2086. As clearly stated
in the statute, those duties required her to "perform ministerial acts to assist. .. [Ms. Heath] in the
sale or purchase of real estate." See I.C. §54-2086(1)(a). Unlike the duties created by I.C. §542087(4), she was not required to "promote the best interests of the client" which, arguably, could
include a more in-depth review of the transaction documents governing the sale.
Ms. Heath did not enter into a buyer's representation agreement with Palmer or Taylor
Real Estate. See R., p.331, 343 (Palmer Deel., ,r2, Taylor Deel., ,r3). For that reason, the portions
of the Path to Health v. Long opinion that incorporated the agent's statutory duties as part of the
agent's contractual obligations are not applicable to the facts of the case. The statutory duties
found at I.C. §54-2086 cannot be engrafted into or made part of a contract that never existed. For
that reason, any alleged violations of I.C. §54-2086 can only be litigated as a negligence claim.
The argument the January 9, 2018 email expanded Palmer's statutory duties is
inconsistent with the plain language of I.C. §54-2086(5) - (6). In those sections, the statute
recognizes the agent is not required to inspect the customer's property or verify the accuracy or
completeness of information provided by the seller or any other reasonably reliable source.
Similar language appears in I.C. §54-2087(7). However, §54-2087(7) contains additional
language that allows the agent's statutory duties to be expanded by stating: "unless otherwise
agreed to in writing ... ". Similar expansive language does not appear in I.C. §54-2086.
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is that where a statute is plain, clear, and
unambiguous, the courts are constrained to follow that plain language and neither add to the

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 16

statute nor take away by judicial construction. See Poison Creek Publishing Inc. v. Central
Idaho Publishing, Inc., 134 Idaho 426, 429, 3 P.3d 1254, 1257 (2000). Courts must assume the

legislature means what is clearly stated in the statute. See Permit No. 36-7200 v. Higginson, 121
Idaho 819, 822, 828 P.2d 848, 851 (1992). Additionally, the courts must give every word, clause
and sentence effect, if possible. See 121 Idaho at 822. This Court has recognized that, "where a
constitution or statute specifies certain things, the designation of such things excludes all others".
See Local 1494 of the Int'/ Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 99 Idaho 630, 639,
586 P.2d 1346, 1355 (1978). This rule is often referred to as expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Id.

This Court has been reluctant to second-guess the wisdom of a statute and has been
unwilling to insert words into a statute the Court believes the legislature left out, be it
intentionally or inadvertently. See Boise Street Car Co. v. Ada County, 50 Idaho 304, 308 - 09,
296 P.3d 1019, 1020 (1931); Wright v. Ada County, 160 Idaho 491, 498, 376 P.3d 58, 65
(2016). In Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg'L Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 894, 265 P.3d 502, 507
(2011), this Court held "[t]he fact that a portion of a statute has a restricted application does not
similarly restrict the entire act of which that portion was a part." This principal was applied in
Wright v. Ada County, 160 Idaho 491, 376 P.3d, 58, (2016), where this Court stated that courts

should not second-guess the wisdom of the legislature when it created a statute or, insert words
into a statute. See 160 Idaho at 498. The Court then concluded the existence of limiting language
in the portion of the statute creating a "reporting claim" under the Whistleblower Act could not
be interpreted to be part of a "participation claim" described in a separate section of the same
statute. See 160 Idaho at 65. The same logic is applicable in this case.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF- 17

When LC. §54-2086(5) and (6) were enacted, the legislature purposely omitted language
allowing an agent to expand its statutory duties through a separate writing. Such language does
appear in LC. §54-2087(7) which, as outlined below, governs the relationship between an agent
and their represented client. Considering the statutory duties owed to a customer versus those
owed to a client are very different, the fact the legislature chose to omit language allowing an
agent to expand or modify the statutory duties owed to a customer can only be read as a
limitation upon the agent's ability to take such action. For that reason, Ms. Heath's argument that
the January 9, 2018 email expanded the statutory duties owed to her customer cannot be
accepted. The trial court's ruling that expanded duties did not exist must be affirmed.
4. The January 8, 2018 email did not expand Palmer's statutory duties.

Even if one accepted the argument that Palmer could, through an unsigned email, modify
the statutory duties owed to a customer under I.C. §54-2086, the 1/8/2018 email, R. p.339, did
not have that effect. After Ms. Heath signed the purchase and sale agreement, the seller, Ciccone,
provided a property condition disclosure form disclosing the existence of a shared well
agreement and, the shared driveway agreement. See R., p.311, 333 - 336 (Palmer Deel., ,r4, Exb
4). Palmer immediately forwarded those materials to Heath. Id. Thereafter, Palmer was advised
by the title company that the driveway agreement required modification to include language
recognizing it would "run with the land". See R., p.312 (Palmer Deel., ,r6), 92 (Palmer depo.,
p.45:21 - 46:16), 96 (Palmer depo., p.60:12 - 18). She was told that unless the agreement was
modified, the title company would not insure the title of the property. Id. Palmer was not
involved with any modifications to the agreement. It was her understanding changes would be
overseen by the title company and made by the seller, Ciccone, working with the neighbor,
Wallace. See R., p.312 (Palmer Deel., ,I6), 93 (Palmer depo., p.47:18- 25, p.48:19- 49:1).
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The email Heath relies upon was Ms. Palmer's disclosure of information she had received
concerning the driveway agreement from the title company. Logically, the fact the existing
agreement was a private agreement between the seller and the neighbor, coupled with the fact
title insurance may not be issued unless changes were made, was information that could be
considered an adverse material fact. Consistent with her statutory duties, I.C. §54-2086(l)(d),
Palmer forwarded the information she had received to Heath through the January 9, 2018 email.

See R., p.339.
Heath argues the statutory duties owed by Palmer required her to not only disclose
potentially adverse material facts but then take corrective action for the benefit of a "customer"
she did not represent in order to protect Heath from the impact of the adverse facts Palmer
undeniably disclosed. This argument is not supported by the statutory language of I.C. §54-2086
which describes Palmer's statutory obligations as ministerial acts aimed to assist the buyer with
the transaction. At I.C. §54-2086(5), the statute unambiguously states Palmer was not required to
investigate anything concerning the property for the benefit of Heath including the condition of
the property or, "the accuracy or completeness of any statement or representation made by the
seller or any other source reasonably believed by the licensee to be reliable." (emphasis added)
This would include the statements from the title company advising Palmer the only change to the
driveway agreement it required was language assuring the agreement "ran with the land". See R.,
pp.92 - 93, 312 (Palmer depo., p.45:7 - 47:25; Palmer Deel., ,I6). That information was
forwarded to Ms. Heath. See R., p.339. Palmer and the title company never discussed the length
of the easement. See R., p.93 (Palmer depo., p.46: 17 - 19). The process of modifying the
agreement to include language required to insure the title to the property was overseen by the
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title company. See R., p.93 (Palmer depo., p.47:5 - 21; p.48:19 - 49:1). She never spoke with
Wallace concerning the driveway agreement. See R., p.93 (Palmer depo., p.48:19-49:1).
There is no dispute the information forwarded to Heath was accurate. The title company
had requested the change and, was working with the sellers, Ciccone, to assure the driveway
agreement was modified. The modified agreement was negotiated between the seller and
Wallace, was then forwarded by the title company to Palmer. See R., p.93 - 94; 312 (Palmer
depo., p.46: 13 - 47:25; 49: 10 - 18; Palmer Deel., ,r6). Palmer then forwarded that document to
Heath. See R., pp.312, 363 (Palmer Deel., ,r1; Heath Deel.,

,rt 4).

Heath received the revised

driveway agreement ten (10) days prior to closing. Id. She had already received the 1998
driveway agreement weeks prior to that time. See R., p.363 (Heath Deel., ,113). It is undisputed
she then failed to review either document. See R., pp.363 - 364. It is also undisputed she did not
ask Palmer for any other information or advice concerning the original or the revised driveway
agreements. See R., pp.312 - 313; 363 - 364 (Palmer Deel., ,I8; Heath Deel., ,114). Accordingly,
unlike the facts in Path to Health v. Long, where the agent falsely represented the properties
zoning by advising his client he had checked on the zoning and found it would be acceptable,
Palmer did not, at any time, suggest she had reviewed the revised driveway agreement for Ms.
Heath's benefit. Instead, she simply forwarded the agreement to Heath advising her the title
company would, at that point, close the transaction based upon the revised agreement. See R.,
p.339. There were no other statements or representations from Palmer concerning the modified
driveway agreement. These facts fail to establish any misrepresentation or misstatement of fact
by Ms. Palmer which distinguishes this case from the false statements made by the realtor in
Path to Health.
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Lacking in the language of the 1/8/2018 email, R. p.339, is any suggestion Palmer would
personally draft amendments to the driveway agreement. Legally, she could not undertake that
task as she is not an attorney and, was not representing either Ciccone or Wallace. Instead, as
documented in the email, Palmer advised Heath that the seller and the title company were
working on language to assure the driveway agreement would run with the land. There is no
dispute this statement was accurate. When Palmer received a copy of the completed agreement
from the title company, she immediately forwarded the document to Ms. Heath. See R., pp.312 313 (Palmer Deel.,

,rs);

R., p.363, Heath Deel., ,r,r13 - 14).2 Heath received the modified

agreement ten days prior to closing. Id. The fact she did not read the materials she was provided
does not change the fact that all disclosures required by I.C. §54-2086(1)(d) had occurred. The
statute lacks any language suggesting Palmer was required to remind or encourage her customer
to read documents that were undeniably provided, or, analyze those documents to advise her
whether they contained terms Heath may or may not find acceptable.
Performing "ministerial acts" does not include providing advice concerning the terms of a
contract or, how a disclosed physical characteristic of a property should be considered when
deciding whether to purchase a particular property. To accept Heath's argument would require
judicial modification of I.C. §54-2086 to include legal duties the legislature did not include in the
plain language of the statute. This approach would violate clearly established statutory
constitution explained in Wright v. Ada County, supra and, should not be accepted.

2

It is unquestioned the amended agreement contained the language identified in the 1/9/2018
email assuring the agreement "ran with the land" See R., p.411. Additionally,and as recognized
by the District Court, the fact the prior agreement was a private agreement between the seller and
the neighbor, Wallace, was accurate. See R., p.411.
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C. Contract Claims

Ms. Heath argues that Palmer breached her contractual duties by failing to undertake or
monitor the modifications to the shared driveway agreement the seller/Ciccone and the
neighbor/Wallace were negotiating. She argues she was a "client" owed at least some of the
duties set forth at I.C. §54-2087. See appellant's brief, pp.18 - 20. Recognizing a written buyer's
representation agreement was never prepared or signed, Heath attempts to argue the statutory
duties owed to a "customer" under I.C. §54-2086 are supplemented by the duties owed to a
"client" under I.C. §54-2087. See appellant's brief, pp.21 - 22. These arguments are inconsistent
with the language of the respective statutes and, are not supported by the record. The District
Court correctly considered Heath's contract claims by focusing upon whether a written
representation agreement between herself and Palmer ever existed. The District Court's ruling
should be affirmed.
1. Heath was never a "client" of Palmer or Taylor Real Estate.

The Third-Party Complaint alleged that "Heath had a contract for real estate services with
Palmer and Taylor, which by rule incorporated duties set forth by law." See R., p.159 (ThirdParty Complaint, ,r44). Heath alleged Palmer breached the parties contract by violating statutory
duties owed to "clients" found at I.C. §54-2087. See R., pp.159, 284 - 286. This theory was
challenged at summary judgment on the grounds Heath and Palmer never entered into a written
buyer's representation agreement. See R., pp. 311, 343. (Palmer Declaration, ,r2; Taylor
Declaration, ,r3). Citing I.C. §54-2084, Palmer argued that, in the absence of a written
representation agreement, an agency relationship did not arise. See I.C. §54-2084; Johnson v.
McPhee, 147 Idaho 455, 461 - 62, 210 P.3d 563, 569 - 70 (Ct. App. 2009) (agency

representation does not exist in the absence of a written agreement); Blackmore v. ReMax Tri-
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Cities, 149 Idaho 558, 237 P.3d 655 (2010) (agency duties can only be created by a written

agreement).
In her response to Palmer's motion for summary judgment, Heath did not suggest a
contract for agency representation was ever created or signed. Instead, she provided the District
Court a portion of the November 20, 2017 text message where she asked Palmer, who was her
cousin, if she could help her as she "might want to look into buying a house." See R., p.366
(Heath Declaration, Exb A). Palmer responded by stating "I can help you get started." Id. Four
days later, November 24, 2017, Heath signed an agency disclosure receipt acknowledging she
had been provided a copy of the agency disclosure brochure. See R., pp.316 - 31 7. The same
day, she signed the RE-21 Purchase and Sale Agreement extending an offer to purchase the
property. See R., pp. 319 - 327. (Palmer Deel., Exb 1 and 2). Clearly, the November 20, 2017
text was not an agreement for agency representation. Instead, Heath was asking her cousin if she
would consider being her realtor if she decided to purchase a home. The record is undisputed
that, other than the one text message, Heath and Palmer never discussed future representation if
Heath eventually decided to purchase a home until 11/24/2017 when they met and Heath signed
the agency disclosure receipt and the offer to purchase the property was created. The 11/20/2017
text is nothing more than an inquiry asking whether Palmer would consider representing Heath.
At best, it is an agreement to potentially agree to agency representation sometime in the future.
"Generally, an agreement to agree is unenforceable, as its terms are so indefinite that it
fails to show a mutual intent to create an enforceable obligation.... No enforceable contract
comes into being when the parties leave a material term for future negotiations, creating a mere
agreement to agree." Maroun v. Wyreless Systems Inc., 141 Idaho 604, 614, 114 P.3d 974, 984
(2005), abrogated on other grounds, Wandering Trails, LLC v. Big Bite Excavation, Inc., 156
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Idaho 586, 329 P.3d 368 (2014); University Place/Water Center Project v. Civic Partners West,
LLC, 146 Idaho

527, 533, 199 P.3d 102, 108 (2008) ("[W]here a contract is too vague,

indefinite and uncertain as to its terms, and not merely ambiguous, there has been no 'meeting of
the minds' which is necessary for contract formation and the courts will 'leave the parties as they
found them'.").
The November 20, 2017 text message was clearly intended as the start of future
discussions regarding whether Palmer would agree to represent Heath and, under what terms and
conditions. Lacking is any discussion concerning the terms of Palmer's compensation, what
specific transactional services she would agree to provide, what type of property and purchase
terms she would be authorized to pursue on Heath's behalf and, how long any representation she
agreed to undertake would last. These are material terms that must be incorporated into any
representation agreement. See J.C. §54-2085 (identifying terms that must be included in a
representation agreement.); I.C. §54-2094 (requiring the representation agreement to state when
agency representation will commence and end.) The fact these terms were never agreed upon
establishes a contract for representation was never formed. The fact an agency relationship did
not exist was then memorialized in the purchase contract Ms. Heath signed. At ,I34, the
agreement unambiguously states "The brokerage working with the BUYER(S) is acting as a
NONAGENT for the BUYER(S)." See R., p.324. Because the record failed to establish that
Heath and Palmer negotiated and signed a buyer's representation agreement, the District Court
correctly concluded that agency representation never existed. See R., 409. Its decision should be
affirmed.
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2. Contractual duties do not arise under I.C. §54-2086

Relying upon Path to Health v. Long, supra, Heath argues the statutory duties owed
under I.C. §§54-2086 and 2087 were incorporated into the real estate purchase contract that
existed between Ms. Heath and the seller/Ciccones. See appellate brief, pp.21 - 22; R., pp.319 327.
As admitted by Heath, the portion of the purchase contract she contends should be
interpreted to create agency representation is the "Representation Confirmation" clause found at
page 6 of the agreement where she acknowledges the agent working with the seller/Ciccone was
the agent of the seller and, that the agent she was working with, Angela Palmer, was a
"NONAGENT for the BUYER(S)". See R., p.324.
Reviewing the terms of the entire purchase contract does not support the argument it was
intended to create a contract for agency representation between the real estate professionals
working with either the seller or the buyer. It is unquestioned neither of the real estate agents are
signatories to the purchase contract. See R., p.325 Instead, the agency representation
confirmation clause found at page 6, 134 of the contract simply acknowledges the relationship
between the parties and the real estate professionals they were each, individually, were working
with.
This court has consistently ruled that, for a contract to be formed, there must be a meeting
of the minds. See Inland Title Co. v. Comstock, 116 Idaho 701, 703, 779 P.2d 15, 17 (1989). A
meeting of the minds is evidenced by a manifestation of intent to contract which takes the form
of an offer and acceptance. Id. The "meeting of the minds" must occur on all material terms to
the contract. See Dursteler v. Dursteler, 108 Idaho 230, 233 - 34, 697 P.2d 1244, 1247 -48 (Ct.
App. 1985); "For a contract to exist, a distinct understanding that is common to both parties is
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necessary." See Wandering Trails LLC v. Big Bite Excavation, I11c., 156 Idaho 586, 592, 329
P.3d 368, 374 (2014). "A party's subjective undisclosed intent is immaterial to the interpretation
of a contract." See J.R. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 614, 167 P.3d 748, 751 (2006). A
contract can only exist when there is an understanding common to both parties. See Gray v. TriWay Construction Services, Inc., 147 Idaho 378, 384, 210 P.3d 63, 69 (2009). In other words,

"formation of a valid contract requires a meeting of the minds as evidenced by a manifestation of
mutual intent to contract." See Federal Nat'/ Mortgage Ass'n v. Hafer, 158 Idaho 694, 701 02, 351 P.3d 622, 629- 30 (2015).
In this case, the purchase contract between Ms. Heath and the Ciccones does not suggest
it was intended to create agency representation between either of the principles and the real
estate professionals. The contract does not contain a signature line for either the seller's agent or,
Ms. Palmer. Most important, the purchase contract does not address any of the material terms
that would be necessary to a contract creating agency representation. As outlined above, the
IBRA requires a representation agreement to address various terms including the agent's
compensation,~ I.C. §54-2089, and the duration of the agency relationship. See I.C. §54-2091.
Perhaps most important, at J.C. §54-2085(6) the legislature has specifically stated that neither the
agency disclosure brochure or, "the representation confirmation shall create a brokerage
relationship. A separate, signed, written agreement is required for that purpose."
Based upon the foregoing, Heath's suggestion that the agency confirmation section in the
purchase contract created a representation agreement between herself and Palmer is inconsistent
with I.C. §54-2085(6), and inconsistent with the language of purchase contract. Heath's
argument suggesting the agency confirmation paragraph can be interpreted as a representation
agreement is legally frivolous. Heath's contract arguments are dependent upon the proposition
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the purchase and sale agreement can be interpreted to create agency representation. That
argument is without merit.
For that reason, all arguments advancing the proposition that statutory duties created in
LC. §§54-2086 and 54-2087 can be utilized interchangeably are also without merit and, were
properly rejected by the District Court.
D. Damages

The third-party complaint filed by Heath sought (I) indemnification for Palmer's alleged
breach of contract, R. p.79, and reliance damages flowing from Palmer's alleged breach of
contract. See R., p.288. The District Court ruled her indemnity claims were not supported by the
record as it is undisputed Palmer had disclosed the 2018 driveway agreement. Additionally, the
court ruled her statutory duties, as a non-agent, did not obligate Palmer to assure the pennanent
easement created by the 2018 agreement included the entire driveway. See R., p.414. Finally, the
District Court ruled that contract law did not override the statutory duty remedies created by I.C.
§54-2086.
Ms. Heath mistakenly argues contract remedies are available when a real estate agent
fails to comply with the statutory duties created by LC. §54-2086. That argument is inconsistent
with Path to Health LLP v. Long, supra, where this Court ruled the statutory duties owed to a
represented client under I.C. §54-2087, were incorporated into the parties written representation
agreement. See 161 Idaho at 57 - 59. Before the statutory duties outlined at §54-2087 can arise, a
written representation agreement must be executed which then creates the "client" relationship
between the agent and the buyer or seller they are representing. See Staff of the Idaho Real

Estate Commission v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630, 22 P.3d 105 (2001).
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As found by the District Court, a written representation agreement never existed between
Heath and Palmer. See R., pp.404, 409. For that reason, the statutory duties Palmer owed to her
"customer" could not be incorporated into a contract that never existed. See §III. C. l, supra. Her
claims against Palmer, if any, lie in tort arising from any statutory duties Heath can establish
were violated which then caused her alleged damages. The District Court correctly ruled her
claims for indemnity and reliance damages, which Heath she alleged arose from a breach of
contract, were not supported by the record. Because the breach of contract claims were properly
dismissed, the District Court properly dismissed the indemnity and reliance damage claims
which Heath alleged arose only from the breach of a contract for agency representation which,
did not exist.
To the extent Heath's indemnity claims are based upon equitable indemnity, the District
Court's ruling is supported by the record and, existing precedent. While equitable indemnity is
recognized, a plaintiff must establish they are without fault and, absent indemnity, will be
compelled to pay damages caused by the negligence of the defendant. See Industrial Indemnity
Co. v. Columbia Basin Steel & Iron, Inc., 93 Idaho 719, 723, 471 P.2d 574, 578 (1970); May
Trucking Co. v. International Harvester, 91 Idaho 319,543 P.2d 1159 (1975); Beitzel v. City of
Couerd'Alene, 121 Idaho 709,827 P.2d 1160 (1992).

The Petition for Quiet Title, Joint Protection Order and Preliminary Injunction filed by
the Wallaces alleges specific wrongdoing on the part of Heath and, Mr. Still. See R., p.14. Other
than the fact Heath and the Wallaces are bound by the shared driveway agreement, Ms. Palmer
had no involvement in the ongoing disputes between those individuals. Those disputes arose
after closing. See R., p.14. Palmer's statutory duties ended once the closing occurred. See I.C.
§54-2086. Considering the IBRA abolished common-law agency in regulated real estate
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transactions, ~ LC. §54-2094, there is no legal basis whereby fault ascribed to Palmer could be
imputed to Heath creating liability to the Wallaces. Additionally, as noted by the District Court,
Ms. Heath was, ten days prior to the closing, provided a copy of the 2018 driveway agreement
and should have reviewed that document. See R., p.413. If she had any questions, she could have
directed those inquiries to either the title company, the Wallaces, or Ms. Palmer. It is
unquestioned, she did not read the agreement and, did not ask anyone for clarification or advice
concerning the 2018 agreement. See R., p.364 (Heath Deel., ,Il 4). These facts are undisputed
and establish that, if she is found liable to the Wallaces, Heath will not be blame-free. For that
reason, she is not entitled to equitable indemnity. See Industrial Indemnity Co., 93 Idaho at 723.
Additionally, considering she failed to read documents which were, undeniably provided to her
in a timely fashion, establishes she did not justifiably rely upon any alleged omissions by Palmer.
See Irwin Rogers Insurance Agency v. Murphy, 122 Idaho 270,273,833 P.2d 128, 131 (1992).

("[A] party who signs an instrument manifests assent to it and may not later complaint that he
did not read the instrument or that he did not understand its contents.").
Based upon the foregoing, the District Court correctly dismissed the plaintifrs indemnity
and reliance damage claims.
E. Attorney Fees

The third-party complaint filed by Heath against Ms. Palmer contained two separate
causes of action. Count One alleged negligence where, Count Two alleged "Heath had a contract
for real estate services with Palmer and Taylor ... " which Palmer and Taylor breached. See R.,
p.159 (Third-Party Complaint, p.9, ,i,r44 - 45).
Mandatory attorney's fees are allowable under I.C. §12-120(3) where "the prevailing
party in a civil action involving a commercial transaction based on a contract is entitled to an
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award of reasonable attorney's fees." See Willie v. Board of Trustees, 138 Idaho 131, 136, 59
P .3d 302, 307 (2002) ("Where a party alleged the existence of a contractual relationship of a type
embraced by § 12-120(3) ... that claim triggers the application of the statute and a prevailing party
may recover fees even though no liability under a contract was established."). See also Farmers
Nat'l Bank v. Shirley, 126 Idaho 63, 73, 878 P.2d 762, 772 (1994); Lexington Heights
Development, LLC v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276, 287, 92 P.3d 526, 537 (2004) ("Where a
party alleges the existence of a contract" within the scope of I. C. § 12-120(3 ), "that claim triggers
the application of the statute and the prevailing party may recover attorney's fees even though no
liability under the contract is established."); see also Miller v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical
Center, Inc., 139 Idaho 825, 839, 87 P .3d 934, 948 (2004).
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) is implicated in this case as, "[ a]ctions brought for breach of an
employment contract are considered commercial transactions, subject to the attorney fee
provisions of LC. §12-120(3)." Mackey v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 145 Idaho 408, 415, 179
P.3d 1064, 1071 (2008); Willie v. Board of Trustees, 138 Idaho at 136 ("Actions brought for
breach of an employment contract are considered commercial transactions and are subject to the
attorney fee provision ofl.C. §12-120(3).").
In Atwood v. Western Construction Co., 129 Idaho 234, 923 P.2d 479 (Ct. App. 1996),
the Court reversed the trial court's denial of attorney's fees in a case alleging an employer had
breached an alleged employment contract. The Court explained the trial court's error by writing:
The trial court concluded that a contract to render personal services in the form a
master-servant relationship is not covered by § 12-120(3) and, consequently,
denied Western's request for attorney's fees. We deem this decision to be
erroneous.
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See 129 Idaho at 241. Citing the Supreme Court's opinion in Property Management West, Inc.
v. Hunt, 126 Idaho 897, 894 P.2d 130 (1995), the Atwood court ruled:

[I]n view of the Hunt decision, we conclude that actions on employment contracts
are subject to the attorney fee provisions of I.C. §12-120(3). Consequently,
Western should be granted attorney's fees it incurred in successfully defending
Atwood's claims for breach of express and implied contract terms, including the
claim for violation of the implied covenant of good faith.

Id. In this case, the District Court awarded Palmer attorney's fees as the third-party complaint
clearly alleged a breach of contract arising from an employment/agency relationship. As noted
above, Ms. Heath failed to challenge that ruling on appeal.
Consistent with the District Court's ruling, Heath is also entitled to all attorney's fees
expended defending the present appeal. Heath contends a contractual relationship for agency
services existed between herself and Ms. Palmer. Those allegations trigger the attorney fee
provisions found at I.C. § 12-120(3). Accordingly, Palmer should be awarded all attorney fees
incurred defending this appeal.
IV.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, the District Court's ruling granting summary judgment to
Angela Palmer and Jed Taylor should be affirmed. Additionally, Palmer should be granted her
attorney's fees incurred defending this appeal
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